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ABSTRACT 
 
In the context of an increasingly aging population, the sustaining of public pension systems 
becomes more and more challenging. The growing number of pensioners together with the 
negative consequences of the financial economic crisis of 2008 and thus, the decrease of 
contributions to the schemes, forced the economies to review their pension systems and 
carry out reforms that assures their sustainability.  This project aims to give a basic knowledge 
of the situation of the current and future Spanish pension system in comparison with that of 
one of the countries that has successfully implemented a notional defined contribution 
model: Sweden. Projections estimated considering different macroeconomic scenarios show 
the seriousness of the Spanish situation in relation with one of those countries that has opted 
for this alternative reform and the goodness that moving to another system of comparable 
characteristics would imply.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The current debate about the sustainability of public pension systems and the unrest of 
population who fear that they might not be able to receive a pension in the future, makes 
this topic a perfect choice for anyone whose aim is to improve the system and search for 
some solutions to this problem. Even though the pressure exerted by population aging, 
amplified by the adverse consequences resulting from the financial crisis suffered in 2008, 
makes public pension systems unsustainable all over the world, the Spanish case is of distinct 
relevance. 
 
The Spanish long-run demographical tendencies convert the current PAYG pension system 
in an unsustainable choice according to the forecasts estimated about population growth and 
life expectancy. It is necessary that the issue is constantly reviewed so more solutions that 
lead to better systems can be achieved. Thus, the choice of the topic for this project is not 
merely coincidence but the result of many debates opened about the sustainability of the 
Spanish pension system and of a personal aim to seek new solutions to a current and constant 
problem. Our primarily purpose of this project is to study the current Spanish situation, as 
well as the threats to the sustainability of the system and to search for alternative solutions 
to this problem.  
 
Sweden is one of the countries with the highest levels of sustainability index according to the 
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (MMGPI) even though a few decades ago its 
situation was as problematic as the Spanish one. The application of a notional defined 
contribution (NDC) system successfully helped to solve the situation and after a transition 
period of 34 years, the balance in the public social security system has greatly improved. Both 
the similarities with the current Spanish situation and the outstanding improvement 
achieved, allow us to consider that a reform of this sort might be appropriate for the Spanish 
case.  
 
Sweden presents annually since 2001 an actuarial balance that allows an extraordinary level 
of transparency as well as an annual and fair picture of the public system situation, allowing 
for the implementation of automatic mechanisms to either improve or at least control the 
imbalance. A comparison between the Swedish and the Spanish actuarial balance from 2001 
to 2006, gives us a first image of how different the situation in both countries is and how 
Spain could have reacted if it had the Swedish system in place.  
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Considering this, and conscious about the unsustainability of the current Spanish situation, 
we have developed some projections of the evolution of the deficit forecasted for the system 
from now on to 2050. The projections have been made according to three different 
economic scenarios: an optimistic, a realistic and a pessimistic one; based on different 
estimations about the main macroeconomic variables chosen for the analysis. Comparing 
these results with some projections of the Swedish public pension system, we have concluded 
that the Swedish situation presents much better estimations about the future than the Spanish 
one, in which the deficit would be at most 3.62 % in the worst scenario by 2050. These 
results provide evidence enough to confirm the convenience of a notional defined 
contribution system for our country’s pension system.  
 
The remainder of this project proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides us with an overview 
of the Spanish public pension current situation, including a description of the main threats 
to its sustainability and the reforms that have been applied. Section 3 proposes a detailed 
description of an alternative solution to the current problem: the notional defined 
contribution system. It summarizes the main features of the system and includes a 
comparison between Sweden and Spain. In section 4 the data used in the empirical analysis 
is explained and section 5 includes the methodology used. Section 6 presents the results 
obtained and finally, the conclusions and final remarks are contained in section 7. 
2. THE SPANISH PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM 
 
Nowadays, public pensions constitute one of the most important line items of public 
spending in most developed countries (de la Fuente, García & Sánchez, 2017). In 2018, 
public pensions represented in Spain a fourth of the total public spending (García, 2019). 
Even though an increase in these expenditures will impose a problem to whichever public 
pension system, it is especially serious for those countries with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension scheme given that the ratio between beneficiaries and contributors is crucial for its 
financial stability (Ramos, 2014) and thus, the Spanish pension system has been hardly 
affected. 
 
The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (MMGPI) defines the Spanish public pension 
system as a retirement income system that comprises an earnings-related public pension 
scheme and a minimum means-tested social assistance benefit. Spain has a mandatory 
contributory pension system funded with the social security contributions of employers and 
workers under a pay-as-you-go principle (Hernández de Cos et al., 2017). Nonetheless, with 
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the last reform it has moved towards a defined contribution model. In the current pension 
scheme, workers acquire a right to receive a social benefit originated by the contribution 
done during the worker’s active life. The amount of the pension benefits is thereby computed 
based on individual contribution years and bases although there are some upper and lower 
limits to the pension amounts that are legally established to assure a progressive 
redistribution. Besides, the Spanish system has a voluntary contribution that in this case have 
a very limited scope. 
 
The Spanish pension system is then based on two foundations. The first and most important 
one is that it is a PAYG system, which implies that current pensions are paid with the 
contributions or taxes of those working right now and the future pensions will be paid by 
those working at that moment (García, 2019). We will focus on this contributory part 
considering the weight it represents over total public spending and the dependency that 
Spanish population has on it. Nevertheless, it is supported by a capitalization system that can 
be individually arranged, constituting it the second pillar.   
 
As shown in Figure 1, the financial position of the contributory part of the Spanish system 
shows a deficit since 2012. The previous period was characterized by a considerably lower 
expenditure in contributory pensions in terms of percentage of GDP. However, the financial 
crisis shot it up until this percentage exceeded the 12% of GDP and this gap between income 
and expenditures is since that moment increasing. Although there has been a slight decrease 
in the deficit from 2017 to 2018, it seems that the financial imbalance is going to stay in 2019 
and onwards, which somehow threatens the sustainability of the Spanish public pension 
system.   
 
Figure 1: Contributing component of Social Security (% of GDP) 
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Source: From García Díaz, 2019. 
 
The magnitude of the numbers and the necessity of generating wealth with the contributions 
of the Spanish population makes it necessary an accurate reform of the pension system that 
guarantees its sustainability.  
2.1. Threats to the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system 
 
International organizations such as the OECD, and prominent researchers (e.g. Vidal-Meliá) 
have recommended an in-depth modification of the Spanish public pension system. Three 
issues have been highlighted in most of the studies already performed: the configuration of 
the pension system, the need of reforms to ensure the financial sustainability of the pension 
system in the long run and the (un)fairness of the current system. Even though we are going 
to focus on the second one given that it represents the main problem of the design of the 
Spanish state pension system, when evaluating potential solutions to this issue, comments 
on the other two are likely to appear. 
 
Notwithstanding that several are the factors that have interceded in the sustainability of the 
Spanish public pension system, two have greatly appeared along years in our country and can 
be considered to be the main cause of the current situation. These include the demographic 
changes that Spain has suffered, and an economic situation extremely harmed by the financial 
crisis of 2008. Considering the nature of the pension public system, both factors are of 
paramount importance for its sustainability.  
 
According to Alonso et al., (2003), the Spanish contributory public system will suffer a hard 
deficit from 2020 on, to the extent that the aging of the Spanish population accelerates and 
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the margins of growth in the rate of employment runs out. Similarly, Ahn et al. (2005) affirm 
that the financial situation of the pension system in Spain will be affected by an adverse 
future demographic situation.   
2.1.1. Demographic factors 
 
One of the most common characteristics of developed countries nowadays is the ageing of 
the population which represents the foremost challenge to pension systems around the 
world. Last decades Spain has experienced a drastic demographic transformation because of 
three main factors: rising life expectancy, a pointed decrease in the birth rate and a shift in 
migration trends which has turned into a negative balance since 2009 (Ramos, 2014). These 
demographic shifts together with the retirement projections of the so-called “baby-
boomers”, those born between 1959 and 1977, aggravates the sustainability problems present 
in the current Spanish public pensions system.  
 
Pension expenditures depends on the number of pensioners and their replacement rate, that 
is, the amount of the pension benefit regarding their earning during the working life. 
However, the income to pay for that expenditures depends on the number of workers 
currently working and their contributions. Considering this equation, it can easily be seen 
how population ageing represents one of the main concerns for the sustainability of the 
Spanish public pension system. 
 
According to the data published in the Spanish National Statistics Institute, the number of 
children born in 2017 has decreased in 4,24% with respect to the previous year. Yet this 
decreasing trend is not new. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the birth rate every year and it 
can be easily observed how this diminishing trend comes upon 2008 after reaching its peak 
and despite its previous increasing trend. Various are the reasons that explain this tendency, 
including postponement of marriage, an increasing number of women in the labor force, 
more births outside marriage etc,.  However, most of them are related to the end of the 
economic surplus cycle that the Spanish economy had experienced in previous years.  
 
Figure 2: Birth rate evolution in Spain 
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Source: Own elaboration from The Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), 2004-2017 
 
Secondly and thanks mostly to health facilities, educational attainment, income and fertility 
(Mondal & Shitan, 2014), life expectancy has increased greatly, and it is expected to continue 
to do so in the future given that mortality rates among the elderly continue to decrease. 
Considering the statistics of the INE, we know that those that are 65 years old nowadays can 
expect to live three years longer than did those who were that age in 1991. The increase in 
life expectancy has important implications for individual and aggregate human behavior. It 
affects fertility behavior, economic growth, human capital investment, intergenerational 
transfers, and incentives for pension benefit claims (Zhang et al., 2001). Given the interest 
of our topic, the consequences it has on pension benefits and thus, in the sustainability of 
the Spanish public pension, are considerably important. A rise in life expectancy originates a 
more aged Spanish population and therefore, the number of pensioners increases as well, 
threatening the situation of the current Spanish contributory system.  
 
Figure 3: Life expectancy evolution in Spain 
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Source: Own elaboration with data from INE, 2004-2017 
 
Lastly, the immigration flows pattern has also suffered changes since 2009, with adverse 
consequences to our country’s public pension sustainability. Despite the fact that Spain 
experienced a positive migration balance from 2000 to 2009 that led to surpluses in the Social 
Security system, migration turned negative as the economic crisis unfolded (Ramos, 2014). 
According to the INE, in 2013 an outflow of more than 250.000 immigrants took place, 
being most of them working age. As for the immigrants that Spain has, the problem relies 
on the fact that most of them are concentrated in the range of age from 20 to 40 years. This 
implies that when they become old, the old-age dependency ratio will increase. 
 
Conde-Ruiz et al. (2008) analyze the effects that immigration has on the sustainability of the 
PAYG Spanish public pension system. They conclude that the inflow of immigrants in 
working age moves the financial problem to next generations since they generate rights for 
receiving future pensions. Additionally, it is predicted that between 2013 and 2022 there will 
be more emigrants than immigrants, suggesting a decrease in Spanish contributions to the 
pension system. Overall, neither an increase in migration flow is enough for adding the 
required resources so as to avoid the financial damage, nor an emigration pattern will benefit 
the contributory Spanish system. 
 
These three factors affect the aging of Spanish population leading to a reduction in the age 
range between 0 and 49 years that, in fact, constitutes an important part of the population 
since most of the taxpayers are within it. Furthermore, these demographic changes lead to 
an increase in the number of pensioners and thereby in pension expenditures with respect 
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to contributors. The ratio of beneficiaries to contributors will be adversely affected. Hence, 
this will impact significantly on the balance, sharpening the deficit and hindering the 
sustainability of the Spanish public pension system. 
 
The commented trend can be verified by looking at the population pyramids in Spain from 
the years 1996, 2011, 2018 and projections of 2050, in which we can visualize the 
aforementioned difference. The Spanish population pyramid has suffered a huge change. It 
has been gradually transformed into a narrower pyramid at the base and wider at the top. 
The population pyramid of 2050 predicts that with the projections available at the moment, 
the process is going to be intensified in the following years. In words this implies a large 
decrease in the number of people below 30 years and an increase in those over 50 years old, 
meaning that while the number of contributors decrease, the number of beneficiaries 
increase. The population pyramid of 2050 shows how the largest cohort for both males and 
females is going to be 70-74 years old, suggestive of the threat that the Spanish demographic 
structure poses to the sustainability of the system. 
 
Figure 4: Spanish population pyramids: development and projections 
  
 
-10.00%-5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00%
From 0 to 4
From 10 to 14
From 20 to 24
From 30 to 34
From 40 to 44
From 50 to 54
From 60 to 64
From 70 to 74
From 80 to 84
100 and more
POPULATION PYRAMID 1996
Women Men
-10.00%-5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00%
From 0 to 4
From 10 to 14
From 20 to 24
From 30 to 34
From 40 to 44
From 50 to 54
From 60 to 64
From 70 to 74
From 80 to 84
From 90 to 94
100 and more
POPULATION PYRAMID 2011
Women Men
 12 
 
 
Source: The Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) 
2.1.2. Economic factors 
 
Demography is, however, not the only change to the Spanish public pension system.  Spain 
was hit hard by the international and financial crisis that destroyed the country for many 
years. The period from 2008 to 2011 was characterized by recession, high unemployment 
rate and stagnation. The decrease in Spanish labor force together with the associated fall in 
revenues coming from the Social Security contributions directly affect the stability of the 
financial situation of the contributory pension system. The deceleration of the increase in 
the productivity and as a result, of real salaries, represents another important economic factor 
in the deterioration of the financial situation of the Spanish contributory system (de la 
Fuente, García & Sánchez, 2017). 
 
As a consequence of the worldwide economic crisis of 2008, Spanish unemployment rate 
sharpened. As shown in Figure 5, the ratio of unemployed persons by total labor force was 
stable or even decreasing until 2007. Nonetheless, the Spanish economy suffered during the 
economic crisis period a destruction of almost 3 million jobs that immediately led to a rapid 
increase in the unemployment rate. The impending consequence was a decrease in the 
revenue side of the Social Security contribution system, greatly destabilizing its balance given 
that not only was expenditure remaining constant, but it was also increasing due to some of 
the demographic factors already commented. The seriousness of the situation was, however, 
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weakened thanks to an additional income injection in the form of taxes from the General 
Administration (García Díaz, 2019). 
 
Figure 5: Spain unemployment rate (2000-2019) 
 
 
Source: Active population survey, Labor market, the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) 
 
Since then, even though an economic recovery has taken place, it has taken years to achieve 
the levels prior to the economic crisis. The economic recovery initiated in 2014 has not 
allowed to a reduction in the deficit until 2017 given that the income rate has increased less 
than pension expenditures (García Díaz, 2019).  
2.2. Recent reforms of the Spanish public pension system. 
 
With a view to balancing out the impact of the demographic shifts and the economic climate 
that the Spanish population has suffered recently, two important pension reforms have taken 
place in the last decade. The last two Spanish governments have implemented reforms in the 
public pension system that seek to secure its sustainability trough the introduction of 
important changes in the contributory pension access, in its computational procedures and 
in its annual updating rate that is for its first time explicitly linked to a financial health 
indicator of the system (de la Fuente et al., 2017). 
 
Law 27/2011of 1 August on the update, adjustment and modernization of the Social Security 
System (in force from 2013), introduced significant changes to retirement eligibility 
requirements, such as a phased-in increase in the legal retirement age, from 65 to 67; a gradual 
lengthening of the period considered to calculate the regulatory base of retirement pensions, 
from 15 to 25 years; and the obligation to provide evidence of having contributed to the 
system for at least 37 years in order to have access to 100% of the pension (Hernández de 
Cos et al., 2017).  
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This law also contemplated the incorporation of a sustainability factor that would align  life 
expectancy to the parameters of the scheme, with the objective of maintaining a 
proportionality between the social contributions made to the system and the benefits 
received during the retirement years. This would increase intergenerational equity, as two 
retirees with the same contribution record but different life expectancies would be entitled 
to the same pension benefit in actuarial terms. According to this law, this factor would 
consider the life expectancy at age 67 and in the reviewed year (expecting to reconsider it 
every 5 years) in relation with the one in 2027. 
 
The estimates available on the impact of the 2011 reform point to a saving of 30%-40% in 
expected pension expenditure in the long term without these reform measures (Ramos, 
2014). However, according to the available demographic projections, these measures will not 
be enough to ensure the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system. Fairness would 
be increased although only for contributory pensions, what would generate inefficiency, 
inequality and inequity for non-contributory pensions. 
 
An article from the Bank of Spain (2017) states that given the deficiencies presented by the 
reform of 2011, the process was intensified with the enactment of Law 23/2013 that 
introduces two additional betterments: a new mechanism to calculate the annual revaluation 
of pensions – the Revaluation Factor (FRA) - (that started in 2014) and the sustainability 
factor into the pension system (starting in 2019) with the name of Intergenerational Equity 
Factor (FEI in Spanish). The former was aimed to set the annual pensions increase using a 
formula based on the system’s budget constraint, whereas the latter constituted an automatic 
mechanism that links the initial amount of retirement pensions to life expectancy.  
 
The sustainability factor was planned to be introduced in 2019, consisting on an extra factor 
in the benefits formula of the initial pension that would reduce the future benefits when the 
life expectancy of population aged 67 increased, making the system more like a notional 
defined-contribution one. However, the difference lies on considering the projected life 
expectancy of the age when the individual is retiring (as in a notional definite contribution 
system) and the life expectancy for 67 years-old population at that time regardless the age of 
the individual that is retiring, as both ages do not necessarily coincide (Banco de España, 
2009). 
 
Before the law of 2013, the growth of the benefits every year was in harmony with the 
Consumer Price Index. Since then, the indexation would also consider budgetary and 
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economic conditions of the system, reinforcing a balance system and equilibrating the system 
in the long-run. Nonetheless, this instrument is limited by the maximum and minimum rates 
that can be applied: pensions will not be increased by more than the Consumer Index Price 
plus 0.5% and not less than 0.25% if the expenditure is greater than the revenues from social 
contributions. 
 
The introduction of these elements placed Spain among the group of EU countries that have 
automatic adjustment mechanisms or sustainability factors for the public pension system 
(Hernández de Cos et al., 2017). Although the European Comission (2015) states that both 
reforms are expected to decrease the pension benefits 7% and 24% in 10 and 20 years, they 
are not enough for avoiding falling into a structural deficit and they do not solve the 
problems that the Spanish public pension system currently presents. Hence, alternative 
solutions might be required. 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE REFORM: NOTIONAL DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM 
 
3.1. Notional defined contribution system.  
 
Considering that Spain is trying to improve the sustainability of its public pension system 
through measures already adopted in other European countries, the implementation of a 
PAYG system based on notional accounts could be of distinct relevance. The cases of 
countries such as Italy, Norway, Poland, Latvia and Sweden are particularly interesting 
because they have notional defined-contribution account systems that operate on an actuarial 
basis. That is, worker’s contributions throughout their working life are accumulated in a 
fictitious (notional) account to which a rate of return is applied according to demographic 
and/or economic variables and is this which determines the value of their pension when they 
retire (Ramos, 2014).  
 
As the World Bank (2010) states, notional accounts are designed to mimic a defined 
contribution plan, where the pension depends on contributions and investments returns. 
Pension contributions are tracked in accounts which earn a rate of return. However, in 
notional accounts, the return that contributions earn is a notional one, set by the government, 
not the product of investment returns in the markets. Pension systems use individual 
registers where contributions are noted down for each contributor and all of them apply 
formulas to transform those registered figures into social security benefits. A notional 
account makes use of the information included in such registers in a different manner than 
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the traditional contributory system does. An individual virtual account is created where 
contributions are deposited, and some fictitious returns are added once a year to hand in, at 
retirement age, the fictitious amount accumulated throughout the individual working life.  
 
The introduction of what are known as notional (or non-financial) defined contribution 
pension accounts (NDCs), as a component of modern multi-pillar pension systems in some 
countries, have been one of the main innovations of the las two decades as regards pension 
reform (Vidal-Meliá et al., 2015). Sweden is one of the few countries in Europe to have 
implemented this reform and it is particularly interesting given the context and conditions in 
which it was developed and its favorable evolution for the sustainability of its public pension 
system.  
 
Representatives of the European Commission have described the Swedish model as the only 
really sustainable approach to pension reform (Scherman, 2003). It represents a clear example 
of how some changes motivated mainly by the aging of the population led to a system that 
has improved the financial stability of the country’s public system. The Swedish reform needs 
were similar to those predominating in most developed countries and thus, in Spain: a normal 
pension age that had been unchanged for decades instead of an increasing life expectancy; a 
“baby boom” generation approaching retirement; and an overgenerous benefit system. 
 
Furthermore, Sweden is according to the MMGPI one of the countries with a system that 
has a sound structure with many good features. Figure 6 shows that Sweden is in the top 
right quadrant of the map, suggesting that its public pension system balance the dual goal of 
delivering financial security for its retirees adequate for the individual and sustainable for the 
economy in general. On the contrary, although the public pension of Spain is adequate for 
the individual, it is far from sustainable for the economy according to the index. All this 
makes it intriguing to study how a reform similar to the one applied in the Sweden case could 
improve the current situation of the Spanish public pension system in terms mainly of 
sustainability. 
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Figure 6: Sustainability Vs. Adequacy of pension systems’ map. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Taken from MMGPI, 2018. 
 
3.2. The Sweden case.  
 
The most important change in the old-age Swedish pension system between 1980 and 2015 
was the major pension reform decided in the Swedish parliament in 1998 (Palme et al., 2018). 
Motivated by the aging of the population, in 1998 Sweden passed legislation that transformed 
Sweden’s public pension system to a notional defined-contribution (NDC) plan (Sunden, 
2006). An important objective behind this reform was to design a system that was both 
financially and politically sustainable in the long run.  
 
In the mid-1980s, actuarial projections began to show that the Swedish pension system 
would face considerable financial shortfalls in the future (Sunden, 2006). The main factors 
contributing to this trouble were a system susceptible to economic development, moderate 
productivity as well as an aging population, similar to other industrialized countries. Taking 
the aforementioned problems into consideration, and without much agreement at the 
beginning, the result was an earnings-related system with notional accounts that was 
combined with a funded individual account component. There was, however, a gradual 
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transition into the new system. Persons born in 1934 received a 20 percent of their benefit 
from the new system and 80 percent from the old system (Palmer, 2000).  
 
The Swedish pension system, which has a total contribution rate of 18.5 percent, has two 
components. The first, and major, component is a PAYG notional defined contribution plan, 
which receives 16 percentage points of contributions. The second component is an 
individual account, the Premium Pension, which receives the remaining 2.5 percentage 
points (Sunden, 2006).  
 
Contributions are recorded in workers’ individual accounts and the account values there 
represent individual’s claims on future pension benefits. They are split equally between 
employees and employers; employee contributions are limited by a ceiling, while the 
employer’s share is levied on all earnings (Sunden, 2006). The account value at the close of 
any year consists of contributions during the year plus the account value from the previous 
year, indexed to the rate of growth of covered earnings (Palmer, 2000). At retirement date 
annual benefits are computed by dividing the balance in the notional account by an annuity 
divisor that is usually fixed by law, and several options exist. 
 
In Sweden, this divisor is determined by average life expectancy at retirement for a given 
cohort at age 65, and an imputed real rate of return of 1.6 per cent that is the expected long-
term real growth rate of the economy assumed by the reformers (Sunden, 2006). This was 
done with the purpose of providing a relatively high initial benefit instead of increasing it 
after retirement. Yet the amount of the annuity is not fixed, since benefits will be adjusted 
annually for inflation. Besides, the divisor is the same for both genders, so an average unisex 
life expectancy is used. A summary of the main characteristics of the notional defined 
contribution Swedish system can be found in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Principal characteristic of the Swedish NDC pension system. 
 
 
 
Pension system configuration 
3 pillar-based system: 
1. PAYG financed by notional accounts of definite 
contribution (16.5% contribution) 
2. Premium mandatory plan of individual 
capitalization accounts (2.5%) 
3. Complementary based on Collective Plans 
Divisor Per capita real wage growth rate 
 Standard formula with unisex mortality tables, 
minimum guaranteed pension at 61 and 
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Basic characteristics of the pension retirement 
formula 
certification of unemployment, sickness and 
temporary disability periods. Real interest rate of 
1.6% 
 
Revaluation causal pensions 
CPI  differential that retains the discrepancy 
between the real and expected wage growth. 
 
Transitory measures 
Yes. The new formula is only applied for those 
born as of 1954. The total implementation is 
expected to be before 2020. 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Devesa-Carpio et al., (2004)  
3.3. Convenience to the Spanish contributory public pension system 
 
In an NDC system, the annual contributions are used mainly to pay the social compensations 
in force. As the contributions that are collected every year are also spent, the individual 
accounts do not consist of real money nor financial assets pledged by property rights, nor 
capitalization. That is why they have been classified as fictitious accounts. Nonetheless, the 
computation of the notional account is real in the sense that it determines the pension that 
is being paid to contributors when they retire. If the annuity divisor is judiciously chosen, a 
bound between the contribution quantity and the accumulated notional fund is created which 
increases the financial sustainability of the system in the long-run (Vidal-Meliá et al., 2007). 
This is an advantage exclusive of notional defined contribution systems that is not shared at 
all by all PAYG systems.  
 
One of the main virtues of a system based in notional accounts is that it facilitates the 
construction of the system’s actuarial balance. Contradicting with the practices followed by 
these systems, traditional contributory pension systems neither prepare nor publish actuarial 
balances for their members and the public opinion in general; not even for the public 
authorities that are the ones that guarantee them. This is not a consequence of the PAYG 
system given that there exist countries that fund their public pensions with this sort of system 
and publish actuarial balances. 
 
The notional defined contribution system is a tool that tends to neutralize, eradicate, cancel 
and minimize what has been called as “populism”. According to Valdés-Prieto (2006), 
populism can be defined as the competition face by politicians that consist of offering 
subsidies or grants without noticing that they are the ones that will pay them later in the form 
of higher taxes, higher contributions, higher inflation or lower growth. This is a problem that 
could be lighten if accountancy is realized according to an accrual base, informing in the 
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actuarial balance about the increase in the passive side that certain measures imply.   This 
system serves to depoliticize the design changes and minimize the electoral use of the PAY 
system, adopting measures with a long-term planning horizon to bring about greater 
intergenerational equity. Contrary to traditional PAYG systems, NDCs introduce periodic 
automatic adjustments without the necessity that they be approved by politicians.  
 
The Sweden notional defined contribution system computes and publishes annually its 
actuarial balance since 2001 and it constitutes a role model as it has introduced really desired 
elements from the perspective of a rational management of pension systems: an 
extraordinary level of transparency, the almost immunization of politic risk and an automatic 
mechanism that corrects financial disequilibrium and increases the trust of the system 
contributors (Vidal-Meliá et al., 2007). Furthermore, the Sweden actuarial balance follows 
the traditional structure of the accounting balance sheet consisting of double-entry 
transactions. Not only the Sweden double entry method provides information about the 
financial position changes in the system during that year, but it also quantifies the causes of 
those changes. Nevertheless, any event that takes place after the balance sheet date are not 
quantified. 
 
Another advantage of an NDC system is that it mitigates the disincentive effect towards 
working that individuals might present given that the retirement benefits depend on the 
contributions made during their working life and therefore, individuals see contributions as 
differed wages rather than as taxes. The application of an actuarial balance makes it easier 
for individuals to understand the accumulation of funds and therefore, the transition to a 
capitalization system will be considerably easier by simply converting the notional account 
into a real account.  
 
Hence, the advantages that this system provides are that it encourages labor supply by linking 
benefits to lifetime contributions, it is sensible to demographic change, it is fair since earnings 
are linked to earnings’ history and the ease in flexible retirement. There are however some 
political challenges. Confidence in the PAYG pension system is steadily declining during the 
past two decades (Börsch-Supan, 2006). Every reform needs then to prove that things will 
eventually get better than without them.  
 
Overall, and taking into consideration that it is not a perfect system, we find it to be a 
potential solution to the Spanish public pension system difficulties.  It is clear that the current 
system presents problems that were it not solved, would jeopardize its sustainability in the 
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very near future. The objective of the Swedish reform was to design a fiscally sustainable 
system tied to economic growth with a clear link between contributions and benefits 
(Sunden, 2006) and thus, this is consistent both with the aims currently pursued by the 
Spanish authorities and with our, as we look for alternatives that could improve the current 
public pension system Spanish situation.  
 
Nothing prevents that the actuarial balance can be applied in a defined contribution PAYG 
such as the Spanish one, mainly if there is a clear distinction between the contingencies of 
retirement and other contingencies. In sum, the actuarial balance applied in the Sweden 
pension system is convenient to the Spanish one in order to improve its transparency, 
solvency and to facilitate the elaboration of reforms to be introduced in the system (Boado-
Penas et al., 2011). 
3.4. Transition to a notional defined contribution system. 
 
If an NDC system were to be applied in our country, a potential path of transition between 
both systems should be outlined over which the current traditional system would be replace 
by a two-pillar based system: a notional system complemented by an explicit subsidies’ 
system for those that have had low income throughout their entire life. This proposal follows 
the one done in the Sweden case and the one carried out by Vidal-Meliá et al., (2007). 
 
Table 2 presents the transition for Spain, where both systems, the current one and the two-
pillar NDC system coexist for 34 years. The participation of the new system will growth 
gradually in time and by 2052 the Spanish public pension system will have been completely 
transformed.  
 
Table 2: Spanish transition calendar 
Retirement year 
New system 
proportion (%) 
Current system 
proportion (%) 
2019 0 100 
2020 3 97 
2021 6 94 
… … … 
2027 24 76 
… … … 
2049 93 7 
2050 96 4 
2051 99 1 
2052 100 0 
Source: own elaboration based on the information from Boado- Penas et al., 2007 
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Of course, this proposal can be varied. The main virtue of the offer is that it allows that those 
working now, begin their notional individual account with a null fund given that the pension 
is computed applying both systems. On the other hand. the main drawback is that the 
weaknesses of the current system are extended in time.  
3.5. Actuarial balance 
 
Already mentioned are the virtues that computing and publishing annually an actuarial 
balance implies for the pension system. The actuarial balance sheet of a PAYG system is the 
financial statement showing the present discounted value of the pension system’s benefit 
promises to contributors and pensioners at a particular date (liabilities), together with the 
amounts of the various assets (financial, real and contribution-based) that back up those 
promises (Boado-Penas et al., 2008). According to Valdés-Prieto (2002) the actuarial balance 
contains a projection of the future at present value. This property allows to register the 
behavior of the different cash flow records.   
 
The main entries that are integrated in the actuarial balance are the ones shown in Table 3. 
Generally speaking, it can be stated that a PAYG pension system is reasonably solvent, and 
that therefore at the date of the balance sheet the participants should have a realistic 
expectation of receiving the benefits that have been promised, without the sponsor of the 
system (the State) having to make non-statutory contributions (Boado-Penas et al., 2008), as 
long as: 
Financial and Real Assets + Contribution Asset or Hiden Asset 
 
Liability to Pensioners + Liability to Contributors 
 
This implies that the accumulated deficit must be nil or negative. If positive, the pension 
system is insolvent and therefore, at some point in the future the sponsor will be forced to 
allocate extraordinary funds to cover the deficit, or that the promises made to some of the 
participants will be at least partially broken. 
 
Table 3: Main entries of the balance sheet of a PAYG system 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Financial and Real Assets Liability to Pensioners 
Contribution Assets Liability to Contributors 
Accumulated Deficit Accumulated Surplus 
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Total Assets Total Liabilities 
Source: Own elaboration from the information at Boado-Penas et al., 2008 
 
According to Boado-Penas (2009), currently and not only in Spain, politicians and the public 
opinion in general take as their point of reference of the solvency indicator the annual cash 
deficit or superavit; that is, they confuse a solvency indicator with a liquidity indicator. 
Therefore, to evaluate the solvency of a system, it is necessary to elaborate an actuarial 
balance.  
3.5.1. Entries of the actuarial balance 
 
Previous literature has named differently the most important entry that this balance sheet 
possesses: Contribution Asset, that is sometimes named “Hidden Asset”. Although some 
discrepancies in naming exist because theoretically both names are referring to two different 
things, for the purpose of this project it is enough to identify them as Contribution Assets 
given that it is how it has been applied to compile the balance sheet for social security in 
Sweden. Contribution Assets can be interpreted as the maximum level of obligations that 
can be back up in the long-run for a specific contribution rate without requiring extraordinary 
funds to cover the deficit, if the conditions of the balance at that specific date remained 
unchanged.  
 
The Contribution Asset is a concept that stems from connecting the actives and liabilities of 
the pension system. It is computed under the hypothesis of a “golden rule” steady-state 
scenario, that is defined by the property of having a real interest rate equal to contributions 
real growth rate, pension liabilities and the whole economy in general. That is why the interest 
rate used to compute the Contribution Assets is directly obtained from the real growth rate 
of the economy and it is not necessary then to do research on the financial market so as to 
identify the applicable interest rate (Vidal-Melía et al, 2007).  
 
Contribution Asset is the outcome of a formula that points out the magnitude of both the 
actives and liabilities of the actuarial balance when the pension system is in actuarial 
equilibrium and it is the case of a pure PAYG, under a simplified scenario. That is, the 
formula presupposes that the ratio actives to passives is one, and that the degree of 
capitalization is zero. This method identifies the size of the asset without delving into the 
origin or economic meaning of the cash flows that support it (Boado-Penas et al., 2008).  
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Contribution Assets are computed as the product of annual contributions by the turnover 
duration (TD). The turnover duration also known as the maturing period of the system is the 
time expected to go by since the moment that a monetary unit enters the system in the form 
of a contribution until it exits it in the form of pension benefit (Boado-Penas et al., 2011). In 
other words, it is the difference between the weighted average age of pensioners and the 
weighted average age of contributors; that is, the average years that a monetary unit is in the 
system before ii exits it in the form of a pension disbursement. 
 
In Sweden, with the purpose of softening the variation of the annual results, both annual 
contributions and the turnover duration are not strictly those of the current year, but they 
are averaged with those of the two former years (Boado-Penas et al., 2011). When population 
is decreasing (increasing) the turnover duration would be slightly overestimated 
(underestimated) and consequently the Contribution Assets in comparison with the 
liabilities. As every year the balance is computed under real data, the balance tends to provide 
a fair image of the reality. The demographic and economic steady-state scenario is not real, 
but due to the slowness in the changes that are gradually gathered in the successive actuarial 
balances, the solvency ratio remains fully valid.  
 
The computation of the liabilities contained in the balance sheet takes into account real details 
of the benefit formula and current demographic and economic circumstances, which makes 
this calculation more difficult than steady state assumptions. On the one hand, the liabilities 
to contributors are the notional capital accumulated in contributors’ accounts and the one 
derived from the commitments with contributors as a result of the old system. On the other 
hand, the liabilities to pensioners are the discounted value of the pensions that have to be 
paid to the current pensioners, taking into account the current life expectancy and the 
technical interest rate to be applied (Boado-Penas et al., 2011).  
 
The accumulated superavit is the accumulated profit or equity of the pension system, that is 
property of the sponsor of the system, the State in this case. The actuarial gain or loss from 
the system in one period is the difference between the increase in the actives and the increase 
in the liabilities during that period.  
3.5.2. The Swedish experience with the actuarial balance sheet 
 
Sweden annually publishes its actuarial balance sheet since 2001 and Table 4 shows the 
Swedish actuarial balance sheet evolution as % of GDP since then to 2006. One of the main 
characteristics of the actuarial balance sheet is that both the assets and liabilities are valued 
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on the basis of verifiable cross-section factors, that is, no projections are made. Therefore, 
current information is used even tough expectations take place about some demographic 
factors. Long term projections for the system’s future evolution are actually included in the 
annual report published of the Swedish pension system, including three different scenarios. 
Nevertheless, this information is not used in the preparation of the statements and it is not 
used to make annual decisions or adjustments that may affect contributors and pensioners 
(Boado-Penas et al., 2008). 
 
Table 4: Balance sheet of the Swedish pension system at Dec.31 of each year as % of GDP 
Year 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
ASSETS 
Financial Asset 30.3 28.8 25.2 23.5 20.6 24.7 
Contribution Asset 209.9 214.2 218.6 222.2 223.2 222.2 
Total Assets 240.2 243.0 243.8 245.7 243.7 246.9 
LIABILITIES 
Liability to Contributors 167.8 172.7 174.9 175.4 175.3 172.3 
Liability to Pensioners 68.9 69.2 68.5 67.9 66.3 65.1 
Accumulated Surplus 1.0 0.3 2.3 2.1 9.2 9.5 
Change in Net Worth 2.5 0.7 -1.9 0.3 -7.0   
Total Liabilities 240.2 243.0 243.8 245.7 243.7 246.9 
FUNDING AND SOLVENCY INDICATORS 
Solvency ratio 1,0149 1,0044 1,0014 1,0097 1,009 1,0402 
Degree of funding % 12.80 11.90 10.35 9.64 8.51 10.40 
(Liabilities to Contributors/Liabilities) % 70.9 71.4 71.8 72.1 72.6 72.6 
Source: own elaboration from the information at Boado-Penas et al., 2008. 
Considering the information provided in Table 3, the degree of funding of the system is 
clearly positive which allows possible shortfalls in the system’s income too as compared to 
expenditure to be dealt with by selling financial assets (Boado-Penas et al., 2008). In fact, it 
reaches it maximum the last year studied which might imply a positive perspective for the 
evolution of the system. Besides, given that the solvency ratio for all the years being studied 
is higher than 1, the Swedish pension system presents a high degree of solvency. It is not 
probable then that support from the State will be sought, which is indicative of a sustainable 
situation at least during the years studied.  
3.5.3. Spanish actuarial balance sheet 
 
Our first aim was to replicate the Sweden actuarial balance for Spain until year 2018 so as to 
understand how it would be the current situation if Spain had a notional defined contribution 
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system and therefore assess the appropriateness of this system to the Spanish case given that 
compiling a balance sheet of this sort is essential. We also wanted to do some projections 
from this data to see the evolution and future sustainability of the system, but the available 
data is not enough for computing it and as already mentioned, the actuarial balance do not 
use projections but just current available data. 
 
Nonetheless, Vidal-Meliá et al., (2007) have computed some estimates of the actuarial 
balance sheet for the Spanish contributory retirement pension system for the period from 
2001 to 2006 following as far as possible the philosophy used to gather the Sweden balance 
sheet, that offer a first image of the Spanish situation measured in actuarial terms. Given that 
there are differences in the design of the system (defined-benefit versus notional defined-
contribution), this data does not provide evidence on how an NDC would change the 
Spanish situation. However, it gives interesting information to contrast both systems and 
look for possible advantages of applying the Sweden model. The evolution of the balance 
sheet for the Spanish public pension system for the period 2001 to 2006 is shown in Table 
5. 
 
Table 5: Balance sheet for the Spanish pension system at 31 December each year (% of GDP) 
Year 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
ASSETS 
Financial Asset 3.68 3.00 2.3 1.54 0.85 0.36 
Contribution Asset 192.21 189.18 189.25 194.73 196.85 204.49 
Accumulated Deficit 85.46 88.72 79.30 76.58 67.17 71.96 
Losses for the period 4.12 3.42 16.32 8.55 15.01 0.00 
Total Assets 285.47 284.32 287.17 281.40 279.88 276.81 
LIABILITIES 
Liability to Contributors 225.45 223.49 226.41 219.77 216.56 214.70 
Liability to Pensioners 60.01 60.82 60.76 61.63 63.31 62.11 
Total Liabilities 285.47 284.32 287.17 281.40 279.88 276.81 
FUNDING AND SOLVENCY INDICATORS 
Solvency ratio 0.686 0.676 0.667 0.697 0.706 0.740 
Defree of funding % 1.29 1.06 0.80 0.55 0.30 0.13 
(Liabilities to Contributors/Liabilities) % 79.0 78.6 78.8 78.1 77.4 77.6 
 
Source: own elaboration from Vidal-Meliá et al., 2007. 
 
The results allow for an interesting interpretation of the Spanish situation during those years 
that allows for overviewing the imbalance of the system in relation with that of Sweden. The 
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value of the financial asset shows an increasing tendency, rising from 0.4 percent to 3.7 
percent of GDP due to the cash-flow surplus that the contributory system suffered those 
years. The degree of funding remains low, hardly reaching 1.3 per cent of liabilities in 2006 
whereas in Sweden it was 12.8 percent that year. This is the result of the increasing tendency 
followed by the liability side and the decreasing pattern of the contribution assets.  Not only 
the value of the contribution asset is smaller than in Sweden, but it also has fallen by 12 
percentage points of GDP in 5 years. 
 
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the assets, liabilities and accumulated deficit (as % of GDP) 
of the Spanish pension system considering the data contained in Table 5 for the period 
studied. The graph corroborates that contribution assets follow a decreasing tendency 
whereas liabilities are augmenting. Consequently, the accumulated deficit is also increasing. 
Given that this data is for the period before the Spanish economic crisis and considering the 
current Spanish situation, if a Spanish actuarial balance sheet were to be updated, we would 
expect this deficit to be higher as well.  
 
Figure 7: Evolution of the Spanish accumulated deficit, contribution asset and liabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
By comparing Tables 4 (Sweden) and 5 (Spain) we can see the difference between the 
solvency of the Swedish system, that can back up all its liabilities, and the insolvency of the 
Spanish one, that can back up just 68.6% of its liabilities. This information is summarized in 
Figure 8 that shows graphically the evolution of the solvency ratio for both countries. Even 
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though the pattern followed by the solvency ratio of both countries is comparable, 
throughout all the period studied the Swedish solvency ratio is 0.3 higher than in Spain.   In 
the Swedish system, new participants do not bring any additional deficit. However, in the 
Spanish one the new participants increase the pension system’s deficit and therefore, the 
level of insolvency in Spain increases as the number of contributors increases.  
 
Figure 8: Swedish vs. Spanish solvency ratio evolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
One of the main differences between both systems is the automatic balance mechanism. In 
the Spanish defined-benefit design, the current evolution continues until new legislation is 
adopted. By contrast, if the Swedish system had a balance sheet like the Spanish one, the 
automatic balance mechanism would be activated immediately. This would reduce the 
notional interest rate, cutting liabilities to contributors, and would also reduce the rate of 
indexation of pensions, reducing liabilities to pensioners. This harsh adjustment would be 
maintained automatically until the balance sheet reached solvency (Boado-Penas et al, 2008). 
 
These results ratify the assumptions made about the deficiencies that the Spanish public 
pension system presents as well as the benefits that introducing a system of these 
characteristics in our country will imply. Nevertheless, this information is not yet updated. 
Given that the available information is not enough for updating the actuarial balance sheets, 
some projections are done in Section 6 with the available information and differentiating 
various macroeconomic scenarios with the aim to provide evidence on the problems of the 
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system if adequate reforms are not taken. These results are then compared to those for 
Sweden so as to see the differences in the sustainability of both systems, which are suggestive 
of the advantages and drawbacks that the different systems provide. 
4. DATA 
 
To analyze the future situation of the Spanish public pension system considering the 
economic and demographic available information and, thus, to verify whether alternative 
reforms such as the implementation of an NDC system would be needed; the PENSREF: 
Pension Reform Database and the Spanish Social Security Institute (INSSS in Spanish) have 
been primarily used to gather the required data and to elaborate different scenarios for 
assessing its future sustainability.  
 
The memories published by the Spanish Social Security Institute (INSS) contain information 
about the main variables needed to understand the situation of the Spanish pensions. They 
provide data about the Spanish Social Security and are classified according to the difference 
Spanish autonomies, by gender and by the different types of pensions. The most recent 
memory published is that of 2017 and so, the one that contains the most appropriate 
information for this analysis. 2017 will be therefore the base year from which projections 
will be made.  
 
Simultaneously, the PENSREF database provides long-term projections of some of the most 
relevant variables influencing pension evolution for all the European Member States based 
on population projections from the Eurostat. To do forecasts about the Spanish pensions 
situation it is necessary to stablish different macroeconomic scenarios (e.g. PIB, employment 
rate, TFP…). Estimations about this macroeconomic information, together with data about 
projections of some of the most important demographic data as well as other relevant 
variables for our analysis, can be found in Appendix I and are the ones that are going to be 
employed in the following analysis. 
 
Finally, and considering the proposals made about increasing the pension spending according 
to the CPI index, the pension revalorization of 1.8% used by the AIReF in its projections 
has been also used in our analysis. Assuming a maximum increase in the Social Security 
income of this percentage, we would be gradually adjusting the system spending with the 
income. 
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5. METHODOLY 
 
In this section we present the initial scenario to test the evolution of public pension spending 
as well as the methodology used for the projections made. To provide evidence regarding 
the seriousness of the situation that the Spanish public pension system is facing and will face 
if appropriate reforms are not taken, and thus, the need to act immediately, an analysis based 
on projections until year 2050 have been performed. The analysis has been subdivided into 
three different scenarios: a pessimistic, a realistic and an optimistic one. For the realistic one, 
we have considered estimations about some macroeconomic variables from the PENSREF 
database; for the pessimistic one, we have computed a 1% less change in the rate provided 
by  this realistic data; and for the optimistic one, we have added up a 1% to the base data. A 
summary of the assumptions made in each scenario is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Macroeconomic data used in the different scenarios. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
GDP 
Optimistic 9% 14% 11% 19% 
Realistic 8% 13% 10% 18% 
Pesimistic 7% 12% 9% 17% 
Employment Rate 
Optimistic -2% 3% -3% 3% 
Realistic -3% 2% -4% 2% 
Pesimistic -4% 1% -5% 1% 
TFP  
Optimistic 6% 8% 10% 12% 
Realistic 5% 7% 9% 11% 
Pesimistic 4% 6% 8% 10% 
Source: Own elaboration.  
The three macroeconomic variables chosen for developing the projections are the gross 
domestic product (GDP), the employment rate and the total factor productivity (TFP). We 
have made estimations of both pension spending and contribution income as proportions 
of total GDP and therefore, we consider it to be an important variable for our results. 
Additionally, both the employment rate and the total factor productivity are relevant for 
wages, for tax collection and ultimately for the income of public pension systems. We have 
used these two variables to forecast the evolution that the Spanish contribution income 
might follow and thus, estimate a representative deficit or superavit of the system.  
 
 31 
Simultaneously, some assumptions shared by the three different scenarios have been made 
to compute the growth in the number of pensioners, in the average pension and in the 
contribution income. Notwithstanding that several are the demographic factors affecting the 
pattern followed by the number of pensioners and following the reasonings of other studies, 
we have considered life expectancy as a representative variable from which infer the 
evolution in the number of pensioners.  Thus, the evolution of this variable has been 
computed by a rule of three considering the life expectancy estimations: the higher the life 
expectancy, the more pensioners would be. Similarly, and consistent with the proposals 
claiming pension revalorizations dependent upon the CPI, we have estimated that the 
average pension would increase according to the 1,8% per year estimated by the AIReF. We 
estimate the following equation: 
 
Average pensiont = Average pension t-1 * (1+1.8%)
 (t-(t-1)) 
Total pension spending is then computed as the product of the number of pensioners and 
the annual average pension and its evolution will depend both on the foreseen life expectancy 
and the pension revalorization being used.   
 
Contribution income has been computed following the same rational but considering more 
variables: unemployment rate, inflation and total factor productivity. We have assumed that 
the inflation rate remains equal for the different ranges of time and that is equal to the 
maximum CPI of 1.8% presented by the AIReF. The equation estimated is the following: 
 
Cont.Incomet = Cont.Incomet-1*(1+ er)*(1+ TFPt)*(1+1.8%) 
 
where er is the employment rate for the period and TFPt the TPF growth rate for the period 
and that will vary both depending on the period of time and on the scenario. 
6. RESULTS 
 
In this section we turn to examine the results obtained from the analysis. Table 7 summarizes 
them distinguishing the three scenarios used: optimistic, realistic and pessimistic. The results 
show that all of them share an increasing tendency in the deficit exhibited by the Spanish 
pension system. In the worst case, this deficit could sum up 3.61% at most.  This deficit is 
explained by the opposite directions that pension spending and contribution income follow, 
that imply an enlargement of the gap between them and thus, a deterioration of the pension-
income imbalance. These results are consistent with the pyramid of population of 2050, in 
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which we have seen how the hard change in the structure of the population might threaten 
the sustainability of the system.  
 
Table 7: Deficit evolution in the three different scenarios (% of GDP).  
Optimistic 2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pension Spending  9,14% 8,88% 9,48% 10,31% 10,47% 
Contribution Income  8,85% 8,61% 8,60% 8,40% 8,29% 
Deficit  -0,28% -0,27% -0,88% -1,92% -2,18% 
      
Realistic 2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pension Spending  9,14% 8,96% 9,65% 10,60% 10,85% 
Contribution Income  8,85% 8,52% 8,42% 8,14% 7,96% 
Deficit  -0,28% -0,44% -1,23% -2,46% -2,89% 
      
Pesimistic 2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pension Spending  9,14% 9,04% 9,83% 10,89% 11,24% 
Contribution Income) 8,85% 8,43% 8,25% 7,89% 7,63% 
Deficit  -0,28% -0,62% -1,59% -3,00% -3,61% 
Source: own elaboration with data from PENSREF, INSS and AIReF 
 
This disequilibrium is nonetheless aggravated in the pessimistic scenario; that is, in the case 
the GDP, the employment rate and the total productivity factor decrease more or increase 
less. These results prove the strong dependency that the system has on the economic 
situation, and how a decrease or a lower increase in those macroeconomic indicators could 
affect the sustainability of the system. The Spanish public pension system is not ready for an 
economic disruption that would cause severe consequences both in income and 
expenditures. The fragility that this system imposes makes it necessary to think about 
appropriate reforms that are concerned about the future of the system and that are ready to 
react if difficult times arise. 
 
By comparison, Table 8 contains a summary of the estimations that have been made for the 
Sweden case. Projected public pension spending as a percentage of GDP will end up at 
6.60% in 2050, a decrease of 1.6% points compared to the starting year 2017. On the other 
hand, the earnings-related pensions will decrease in 0.3 percentage points until 2050 mainly 
due to the ageing effect. This decrease in the income side is however compensated by the 
higher decrease in pension spending and hence, we see how from 2017 to 2050 the Swedish 
system is expected to move from a soft deficit of 0.30% to a 1.00% superavit. These results 
suggest that even though the Swedish system is also threatened by the adverse demographic 
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shifts that most of the European developed countries are suffering nowadays, an adequate 
pension system allows a sustainable situation. 
 
Table 8: Swedish Deficit/Superavit evolution (% of GDP) 
SWEDEN 2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pension Spending  8,20% 7,60% 7,20% 6,80% 6,60% 
Contribution Income  7,90% 7,80% 7,70% 7,60% 7,60% 
Deficit  -0,30% 0,20% 0,50% 0,80% 1,00% 
Source: Own elaboration from Regeringskansliet  
7. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
So far, most of the questions contemplated at the beginning of the project have been 
covered, so the objective of the research has been successfully achieved. We have described 
the current situation of the system, as well as its threats, and we have compared its current 
and future status with a sustainable public pension system: the Swedish NDC system. 
Nonetheless, some problems have arisen during its expounding as the difficulty in the 
computation of an updated actuarial balance as well as the need of such depth and detail has 
made it impossible to compute it. Further research would then be needed if an accurate 
representation of how the Spanish public pension situation would look like in the form of 
an actuarial balance is desired.  
 
We have seen how both countries are sensitive to demographic and economic changes and 
how the nature of each system responds to these changing circumstances. Furthermore, the 
analysis performed is enough for us to conclude that the Spanish situation is far from the 
Swedish one and thus, the advantages that a transition to a notional defined contribution 
model would imply. The annual preparation of the actuarial balance as well as the 
implementation of automatic mechanisms without the need for approval would facilitate an 
efficient revision and reform of the system. Hence, one of the main implications of the 
results obtained in the project is that automatic mechanisms are strictly necessary. in order 
to avoid unfavorable situations and to be prepared for economic disruptions. 
 
There are many different topics that are out of the scope of this project, and would be 
interesting to review: the computation of an updated actuarial balance, a more detailed 
projection of the situation if further reforms were adopted … Researchers and politicians 
should expand their views towards new structural changes rather than small reforms that 
help just temporarily to maintain the system or that are not fully applied. Even though the 
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transition to a different system (e.g. the Swedish NDC system) would imply important 
transition costs, maybe this is the only solution to solve this worrisome problem about the 
sustainability of the public Spanish pension system. A deeper study would be appealing for 
further researchers.  
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9. APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Demographic and macroeconomic projections 
 
Spain   
EC-EPC (AWG) 2018 
projections     
      
Main demographic and macroeconomic 
assumptions                 
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Demographic projections - Eurostat 2015-based 
population projections 
Ch 16-
70 
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 
Fertility rate 0,6 1,31 1,57 1,80 1,87 1,88 1,88 1,88 
Life expectancy at birth                 
males 6,4 80,5 81,0 82,3 83,6 84,8 85,9 86,9 
females 5,2 86,0 86,3 87,4 88,4 89,4 90,3 91,2 
Life expectancy at 65                 
males 4,6 19,3 19,6 20,6 21,5 22,3 23,2 23,9 
females 4,1 23,2 23,4 24,3 25,1 25,9 26,6 27,3 
Net migration (thousand) 123,8 12,9 51,2 119,4 163,4 170,9 
153,
8 
136,
8 
Net migration as % of population 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Population (million) 3,4 46,4 46,6 47,2 48,3 49,3 49,6 49,9 
Children population (0-14) as % of total 
population 1,3 15,1 14,7 13,8 14,7 15,7 15,7 16,3 
Prime age population (25-54) as % of total 
population -9,5 44,0 41,4 35,0 31,6 32,4 33,7 34,6 
Working age population (15-64) as % of total 
population -9,0 66,0 65,1 61,2 55,1 52,1 55,0 57,1 
Elderly population (65 and over) as % of total 
population 7,7 18,9 20,2 25,0 30,2 32,2 29,3 26,6 
Very elderly population (80 and over) as % of 
total population 6,7 6,1 6,3 7,7 9,8 12,6 14,8 12,8 
Very elderly population (80 and over) as % of 
elderly population 15,7 32,3 31,1 30,6 32,3 39,2 50,5 48,0 
Very elderly population (80 and over) as % of 
working age population 13,1 9,2 9,6 12,5 17,7 24,3 26,9 22,4 
Macroeconomic assumptions* 
AVG 
16-70 
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 
Potential GDP (growth rate) 1,5 0,4 0,8 1,3 1,0 1,8 2,2 1,9 
Employment (growth rate) 0,1 -0,3 -0,3 0,2 -0,4 0,2 0,6 0,4 
Labour input : hours worked (growth rate) 0,1 -0,3 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,2 0,6 0,4 
Labour productivity per hour (growth rate) 1,3 0,7 1,0 1,1 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,5 
TFP (growth rate) 0,9 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,0 1,0 
Capital deepening (contribution to labour 
productivity growth) 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,5 
Potential GDP per capita (growth rate) 1,3 0,4 0,7 1,1 0,8 1,7 2,2 1,8 
Potential GDP per worker (growth rate) 1,3 0,7 1,1 1,0 1,4 1,6 1,6 1,5 
Labour force assumptions 
Ch 16-
70 
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 
Working age population (15-64) (in thousands) -2.212 
30.65
9 
30.31
4 
28.87
5 
26.62
7 
25.68
4 
27.2
60 
28.4
47 
Population growth (working age:15-64) 0,5 -0,3 -0,2 -0,8 -0,9 0,3 0,7 0,2 
Population (20-64) (in thousands) -2.733 
28.45
1 
27.92
8 
26.51
1 
24.32
6 
23.15
4 
24.5
01 
25.7
18 
Population growth (20-64) 0,7 -0,5 -0,4 -0,6 -1,0 0,2 0,7 0,2 
Labour force 15-64 (thousands) -840 
22.76
6 
22.86
1 
22.30
7 
20.67
9 
19.80
7 
20.9
28 
21.9
26 
Labour force 20-64 (thousands) -905 
22.52
6 
22.60
3 
22.03
3 
20.42
1 
19.52
8 
20.6
20 
21.6
21 
Participation rate (20-64) 4,9 79,2 80,9 83,1 84,0 84,3 84,2 84,1 
Participation rate (15-64) 2,8 74,3 75,4 77,3 77,7 77,1 76,8 77,1 
                                                             young 
(15-24) 0,7 33,3 32,5 35,0 33,9 33,3 33,6 34,0 
                                                             prime-
age (25-54) 2,2 87,4 88,7 89,8 89,7 89,8 89,7 89,7 
                                                             older 
(55-64) 22,6 59,2 66,8 78,5 81,5 81,8 82,4 81,8 
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Participation rate (20-64) - FEMALES 9,5 73,7 76,8 81,2 83,0 83,4 83,2 83,2 
Participation rate (15-64) - FEMALES 7,1 69,2 71,7 75,6 77,0 76,4 76,0 76,2 
                                                             young 
(15-24) 0,5 31,4 30,5 33,0 31,9 31,2 31,5 31,9 
                                                             prime-
age (25-54) 5,7 82,3 84,9 88,0 88,1 88,2 88,2 88,1 
                                                             older 
(55-64) 32,2 51,7 61,2 76,4 82,5 83,7 84,3 83,9 
Participation rate (20-64) - MALES 0,3 84,6 85,0 85,0 84,9 85,3 85,0 84,9 
Participation rate (15-64) - MALES -1,4 79,3 79,1 78,8 78,4 77,9 77,6 77,9 
                                                             young 
(15-24) 0,8 35,2 34,3 36,9 35,8 35,2 35,6 35,9 
                                                             prime-
age (25-54) -1,3 92,5 92,3 91,6 91,2 91,3 91,1 91,2 
                                                             older 
(55-64) 12,8 67,0 72,6 80,6 80,4 79,7 80,4 79,7 
Average effective exit age (TOTAL) (1) 2,5 64,0 65,3 66,3 66,3 66,3 66,4 66,4 
Men 2,8 63,4 64,8 66,0 66,1 66,1 66,1 66,2 
Women 2,2 64,5 65,8 66,5 66,6 66,6 66,6 66,7 
Employment rate (15-64) 11,4 59,6 63,0 66,3 69,1 71,0 70,7 71,0 
Employment rate (20-64) 13,7 63,9 68,0 71,6 74,9 77,9 77,7 77,6 
Employment rate (15-74) 11,4 52,6 55,6 57,9 59,0 60,6 63,6 63,9 
Unemployment rate (15-64) -11,9 19,7 16,4 14,2 11,0 7,9 7,9 7,9 
Unemployment rate (20-64) -11,6 19,3 16,0 13,8 10,8 7,7 7,7 7,7 
Unemployment rate (15-74) -12,0 19,6 16,2 13,7 10,5 7,5 7,6 7,6 
Employment (20-64) (in millions) 1,8 18,2 19,0 19,0 18,2 18,0 19,0 20,0 
Employment (15-64) (in millions) 1,9 18,3 19,1 19,1 18,4 18,2 19,3 20,2 
                                                             share of 
young (15-24) 3,3 5% 5% 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 
                                                             share of 
prime-age (25-54) -9,0 80% 76% 67% 67% 73% 
72
% 
71
% 
                                                             share of 
older (55-64) 5,7 15% 19% 26% 27% 19% 
20
% 
21
% 
Dependency ratios 
Ch 16-
70 
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 
Share of older population (55-64) (2) 0,9 18,7 20,9 25,2 24,7 17,9 18,1 19,5 
Old-age dependency ratio 15-64 (3) 18,0 28,6 31,0 40,8 54,7 61,9 53,2 46,6 
Old-age dependency ratio 20-64 (3) 20,7 30,9 33,7 44,4 59,9 68,6 59,2 51,6 
Total dependency ratio (4) 23,8 51,5 53,7 63,3 81,4 91,9 81,8 75,3 
Total economic dependency ratio  (5) -17,8 152,1 139,3 133,6 143,9 153,7 
145,
4 
134,
3 
Economic old-age dependency ratio (15-64) (6) 13,1 47,2 47,3 55,9 71,4 80,5 70,4 60,2 
Economic old-age dependency ratio (15-74) (7) 10,4 46,8 46,4 53,0 66,3 75,6 67,2 57,2 
Source: PENSREF database 
 
Figure 1: Pension spending – Realistic projections.  
Realistic  8% 13% 10% 18% 
  2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pensioners 9.572.436 9.618.430 9.756.411 9.888.643 10.015.125 
Annual average pension 11.134,44 11.746,59 14.040,72 16.782,91 20.060,65 
Life expectancy 83,3 83,7 84,9 86,0 87,1 
Pension spending 106.584 112.984 136.987 165.960 200.910 
GDP 1.166.319 1.260.942 1.418.997 1.566.255 1.852.159 
Pension spending (% GDP) 9,14% 8,96% 9,65% 10,60% 10,85% 
Source: own elaboration with data from PENSREF, INSS and AIReF.  
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Figure 2: Pension spending – Optimistic projections. 
Optimistic  9% 14% 11% 19% 
  2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pensioners 9.572.436 9.618.430 9.756.411 9.888.643 10.015.125 
Annual average pension 11.134,44 11.746,59 14.040,72 16.782,91 20.060,65 
Life expectancy 83,3 83,7 84,9 86,0 87,1 
Pension spending (€ millions) 106.584 112.984 136.987 165.960 200.910 
GDP (€ millions) 1.166.319 1.272.605 1.444.848 1.609.237 1.919.080 
Pension spending (% GDP) 9,14% 8,88% 9,48% 10,31% 10,47% 
      
Source: own elaboration with data from PENSREF, INSS and AIReF.  
Figure 3: Pension spending – Pesimistic projections. 
 
Pesimistic  7% 12% 9% 17% 
  2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Pensioners 9.572.436 9.618.430 9.756.411 9.888.643 10.015.125 
Annual average pension 11.134,44 11.746,59 14.040,72 16.782,91 20.060,65 
Life expectancy 83,3 83,7 84,9 86,0 87,1 
Pension spending 106.584 112.984 136.987 165.960 200.910 
GDP 1.166.319 1.249.279 1.393.379 1.524.044 1.787.003 
Pension spending (% GDP) 9,14% 9,04% 9,83% 10,89% 11,24% 
Source: own elaboration with data from PENSREF, INSS and AIReF.  
 
